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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is a civil action for personal injury. Jurisdiction of the court 
appealed from is based on Utah Code Annotated Section 78-3-4(1) (1953 as 
amended). 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court to hear this appeal is based on 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j). This case has been poured-over to 
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
Judgment of the trial court was entered on March 21, 1990. A Rule 59 
Motion for New Trial was served on March 21, 1990 which was denied by a 
Memorandum Decision on May 10, 1990. Appellant's Notice of Appeal was 
served and filed on May 23, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Three issues are raised by this appeal. First, whether the trial court 
commits error by instructing the jury regarding tax consequences of a personal 
injury judgment? Second, whether the trial court erred in precluding an expert 
witness from giving an opinion on whether or not defendant was negligent? 
Third, this appeal asks whether the district court erred in allowing into 
evidence statements which were contained in a letter of settlement? 
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DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704 
(as set out verbatim in the addendum) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about May 28, 1986, the appellant, Grant Davidson, was injured 
by a cow or steer that escaped from a wrecked truck driven by appellee, Erwin 
M. Prince, while in the employment of appellee, Folkens Brothers Trucking. 
(R. 1-2.) On November 17,1987, Davidson initiated suit in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah County, State of Utah. Judgment was entered on 
March 21, 1990, for Davidson and against the defendants in the sum of 
$27,323.88, plus interest. 
Davidson submits that three errors of law committed at the trial level 
prejudiced his rights and denied him a fair resolution of the action. To correct 
the three errors, on March 21, 1990, the appellant made a Motion for New 
Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion 
was denied on May 10, 1990 in a Memorandum Decision setting out that if 
indeed the three errors had occurred, they were harmless errors and did not 
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warrant a new trial. Appellant appeals this decision claiming the errors 
committed at the trial court level were indeed harmful and prejudicial; 
depriving the appellant a fair adjudication of the action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about May 28,1986, the defendant/appellee, Erwin M. Prince, 
while acting in the course and scope of his employment for the appellee, 
Folkens Brothers Trucking, did negligently operate his motor vehicle at the 
location of approximately SR 15, in the curve from S.B. SF 15, so as to cause 
vehicle to overturn. (R. 1-2.) 
2. As a proximate result of appellee Erwin M. Prince's negligence, 
various animals that were being shipped in his truck were released on the 
highways and surrounding areas. (R. 2.) 
3. Appellant was injured when an animal that had escaped from the 
appellee's vehicle attacked and gored the appellant. (R. 2.) 
4. The animal occupied the appellee's vehicle immediately prior to the 
accident and the animal's escape was a proximate result of the appellee's 
negligence in permitting his vehicle to overturn. (R. 2.) 
5. Appellant retained counsel and filed suit against the appellees, Erwin 
M. Prince and Folkens Brothers Trucking, for personal injury. (R. 1.) 
6. During trial, expert opinion on the negligence of the defendants was 
excluded on the grounds that the question was an ultimate issue to be decided 
by the jury. (Partial Trial Transcript, Pages 22-23.) 
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7. Portions of a settlement negotiation letter were admitted as evidence 
supporting the defense counsel's emphasis on the distance between the animal 
and the appellant. (Partial Trial Transcript, Pages 47-48, 64-70, and 73-74.) 
8. The jury instructions contained information on the tax consequences 
of a personal injury judgment. (R. 225.) 
9. The jury returned a verdict for the appellant. The jury found Grant 
Davidson 40% negligent, Erwin Prince 60% negligent, and awarded Grant 
Davidson $27,323.88 (60% of total award of $45,539.80), pre-judgment interest 




THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A 
PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT. 
The appellee requested and the court instructed the jury, over the 
objection of appellant's counsel, on the tax consequences of a personal injury 
judgment, (Partial Trial Transcript, Page 73.) There is apparently no Utah 
decision which has addressed this issue. However, the vast majority of our 
sister states have considered this issue and have ruled that such instructions 
are improper and prejudicial. 
This issue is addressed in 16 ALR 4th 589. A state by state review of the 
decisions concerning this issue is set forth. It was indicated there that the 
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appellate courts of the following states have ruled that the instruction is 
improper and prejudicial: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri (has cases going 
both ways), Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
In contrast, the ALR article indicated that the only states that have 
approved such an instruction as being proper are Delaware, Missouri (which 
has cases going both ways), and New Jersey. The article lists two states, 
Florida and Massachusetts, which have held that the instruction is 
discretionary. 
The reasoning of those courts which have found that it is improper to 
instruct the jury on the tax consequences of personal injury judgments is 
founded on firm logic and fundamental fairness. Juries are not instructed that 
the amount awarded to an injured plaintiff will be reduced by the costs of 
bringing his action to trial, or the attorney's fees required to obtain his day in 
court. While the jury may certainly assume that such costs are inevitable, they 
might mistakenly believe that the court will award these costs in addition to 
compensation set by the jury. To instruct the jury, however, that there will be 
no taxes on the amount that they award to an injured plaintiff suggests that 
the plaintiff will be entitled to retain the whole of the amount awarded. 
In the tort system of determining compensation the jury is asked to 
arrive at an amount which will fully compensate the plaintiff. To instruct the 
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jury that certain deductions will not be taken from the judgment, while failing 
to instruct them on the deductions which will reduce the amount ultimately 
received by the plaintiff is clearly prejudicial error. 
Furthermore, the courts which have rejected such an instruction have 
also pointed out one other obvious fact. The future tax liability of personal 
injury judgments is a matter which is so speculative that the trial court may 
not even be instructing on a correct premise of law. 
A review of the decisions which have addressed this issue is illustrative: 
The reason courts adopt the majority view of refusing to take 
income tax consequences into consideration in awarding damages 
for wrongful death is that the amount of a recipient's future 
income tax liability is too conjectural or speculative a factor. 
Scallon v. Hooper, 293 S.E.2d 843, 845 (N.CApp. 1982) 
The court in Barnette v. Dovle, 622 P.2d 1349,1367 (Wyo. 1981), sets out that: 
Similarly, whether the plaintiff has to pay a tax on the award is 
a matter that concerns only the plaintiff and the government. 
The tort-feasor has no interest in such question. And if the jury 
were to mitigate the damages of the plaintiff by reason of the 
income tax exemption accorded him, then the very Congressional 
intent of the income tax law to give an injured party a tax benefit 
would be nullified Following the lead of the majority of state 
courts that have decided the issue, we do not believe a trial judge 
is required to instruct a jury that an award will not be subject to 
federal income taxes. We so hold because we do not believe that 
such an instruction is material to the proper determination of 
damages; nor do we believe that a jury should be instructed on 
federal taxes when it is not also instructed as to the effect of the 
cost of attorneys fees, the costs incurred in preparing the case or 
the various types of insurance that may be involved. 
The court in Paducah Area Public Library v. Terry. 655 S.W.2d 19,25 (Ky.App. 
1983) stated: 
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To inject the incidence of the ever changing tax scheme, federal 
or state, into a jury damage trial would lead the jury into a 
hopeless quagmire of confusion and conjecture. Since our test is 
one's destroyed power to earn money, matters such as marital 
status and personal consumption items such as debts, insurance 
(savings), and general living expenses have been held irrelevant. 
We think it logically follows that a tax debt to the government is 
also irrelevant. We believe this rule is supported by sound 
reasoning and ample authority. 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages S.88 and 
Death S. 154 (1965). There appears to be no reason for abating 
damages in favor of a wrongdoer by deducting tax payments solely 
for his benefit We hold that in personal injury actions such as 
the case at hand the tax liability of claimant is not relevant to the 
case. It can neither be inquired into on cross-examination or 
submitted to the jury for consideration in making the award. 
Similarly, the court in Dehn v. Proutv. 321 N.W.2d 534, 538-39 S.D. 1982) 
quoting McWeenev v. New York. New Haven & Hartford R. R. Co.. 282 F.2d 34, 
37-38 (2d Cir. 1960), states: 
We know of no evidence in this case or empirical data 
demonstrating that this jury or juries in general regularly increase 
damage awards because of a mistaken belief that the state and 
federal governments share in the award through income taxes. 
Furthermore, if a cautionary instruction should be given the jury 
to dissuade it from improperly increasing an award for income tax 
purposes, then perhaps other cautionary instructions should also 
be given on other collateral matters which conceivably affect the 
amount of damages awarded by a jury. For example, a jury might 
be instructed not to increase or decrease an award because one or 
both of the parties must pay attorney's fees in the action. 
It is respectfully submitted that an examination of the cases cited shows 
that the better rule is the majority rule. 'The majority view in this nation, by 
nearly a five-to-one ratio, is that income tax considerations should not be 
impressed upon a jury." Dehn v. Proutv, 321 N.W.2d 534 (S.D. 1982). See 
also, Hansen v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.. 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984); 
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Kirk v. Ford Motor Company. 383 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. App. 1985); Rivera v. 
Philadelphia Theological Seminary. 474 A2d 605 (Pa.Super. 1984); Anderson 
v. Teamsters Local 116 BLDG. Club. 347 N.W.2d 309 (N.D. 1984); Maricle v. 
Spiegel. 329 N.W.2d 80 (Neb. 1983); Hall v. County of New Madrid. 645 S.W.2d 
149 (Mo.App. 1982); Young v. Environmental Air Products. Inc.. 665 P.2d 88 
(ArizApp. 1982); Terveer v. Baschnagel. 445 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio App. 1982); W.M. 
Bashlin Co. v. Smith. 643 S.W.2d 526 (Ark. 1982). 
The fact that personal injury awards may not be taxable, while true, is 
irrelevant to the jury's determination. As appellant's counsel indicated in his 
objection to this instruction, the court will not instruct on other facts involving 
the damage award, despite the fact that they are also true, because they 
prejudice the jury's decision. For example, the jury is not instructed that one-
third of the eventual award, minus costs, will go as attorney's fees. The jury 
is also not instructed that liability insurance is available to satisfy the 
judgment. While all of these factors are true, they are irrelevant to the jury's 
decision and serve to unduly prejudice the jury in making its determination. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT EXCLUDED THE 
TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT'S EXPERT CONCERNING THE 
APPELLEE'S NEGLIGENCE. 
During the presentation of appellant's case in chief, Mr. Newell Knight, 
an accident reconstruction expert, was called to testify to appellee's negligence. 
Counsel for appellant asked Mr. Knight if he had an opinion, in light of his 
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training, skill, and experience, as well as his investigation into the accident, on 
whether or not the defendant was negligent. Mr. Knight stated that he had an 
opinion. When asked to express that opinion, counsel for the appellee objected 
on the grounds that the question embraced the ultimate issue to be decided by 
the jury. The court sustained the objection over the exception of appellant's 
counsel. 
For many years an expert was not allowed to offer an opinion on the 
ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. However, that rule has long since 
fallen by the way side, first through appellate decisions and then through the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise 
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact, 
See ShurtlefP v. Jav Tuft & Co.. 622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980). 
Appellant maintains that the improper exclusion of this testimony was 
indeed prejudicial. The testimony of Mr. Knight involved elements of physics 
and other sciences which can be extremely difficult for a lay person to grasp. 
While it is certainly possible that some jurors possess sufficient education and 
understanding to comprehend the expert's testimony in this regard, other 
jurors may have more difficulty in understanding the substance of the 
testimony. It is therefore necessary in order to present a proper case to all 
jurors that expert testimony provide not only its scientific basis, but its 
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fundamental conclusion. It is to be noted in this case the jury wiw not 
unanimous on the issue of liability, and it is very probable that the restrictions 
placed upon appellant's counsel in presenting IILH case uii till levels tinned 
appellant the right to a fair trial on this issue. Appellant would therefore 
contend that this error in hw should be corrected by the granting of a new 
trial. 
POINT 111 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE 
OF STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS. 
In addition to appellant's claim of error concerning evidence which w < -ut 
to the question of appellee's negligence, appellant also believes that error 
occurred in relation to evidence «• lu< h addi essed appellee's claim of appellant's 
contributory negligence. Appellee's theory at trial was that the appellant was 
negligent in cornering the animal which had escaped from the appellee's truck 
and eventually caused the injury in question. 
In presenting his case, appellee's counsel placed great emphasis on the 
distance between appellant and the animal at, I he lime tlu animal chained 
Evidence was presented from the appellant's deposition that he estimated the 
distance to be approximately 4(1 leel h ur 1 her evidence was ehcited at trial that 
the distance may have been approximately 22 feet. 
However, al trial the appellee's counsel attempted and succeeded in 
introducing a statement from a letter of compromise written (u (lit1 appellee 
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wherein the distance was estimated at 10 feet. This testimony obviously 
provided far greater support to appellee's theory that appellant had "cornered" 
the animal. 
Appellant's counsel objected to this testimony on the grounds that it was 
contained in a letter of settlement negotiation. The court overruled appellant's 
objection and allowed the statement to come in, and then went further to 
prohibit the remainder of the letter to be presented to the jury so that the 
context of the communication could be adequately understood. 
Appellant respectfully submits that this ruling was in error in light of 
Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That Rule provides: 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or 
(2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable 
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a 
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its 
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise 
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require 
the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely 
because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. 
This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is 
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of 
a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an 
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution, 
(emphasis added) 
An examination of the letter in question (addendum) shows that it is 
very clearly a conmnmication involving an offer or willingness to settle 
plaintiffs claim. The statement which was admitted was made in the letter of 
negotiation and according to the Rule is likewise not admissible. 
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The prejudicial effect of this testimony is obviously great in Hit pn M ttt 
case. A person's conduct when confronted by a potentially dangerous animal 
at a distance of 40 feet would be different from the leasouabk person b conduct 
at a distance of 10 feet. Because appellee's counsel placed this question in the 
context oi whether tin aiimi tl u t not min i the distance is extremely 
important. 
It 1% ot course, to be noted that this error was once again pointed out to 
the court immediately preceding closing arguments. The court \u\\ ingnwiowod 
the Rules of Evidence instructed the appellee's counsel to make no reference 
to this testimony in his closing argument 
Nevertheless, appellant contends that this action did not cure the error, 
and directly resulted in the hi^ti percentage of negligence placed upon the 
appellant by the jury as well as the low damages which were awarded. 
Initially, appellant would contend that the evidence was already presented to 
the jury, and that its impact was significant because it, was allowed in met i IK 
objection of counsel in the presence of the jury. Furthermore, appellee's 
counsel, while not directly alluding to the id tool disunite referred to in that 
letter, nevertheless made several references in closing statement which would 
iLiniiid tin (in \ of tin damaging testimony. Counsel once referred to a 
"letter". When making his argument that the appellant had "cornered" the 
animal, he indicated that appellant had estimated other distances during the 
course of the proceedings. Of course, the only n idem e a.s In nlhei distances 
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in this case was the 10-foot estimation which the court had instructed counsel 
to refrain from addressing. (Supplemental Partial Trial Transcript, page 
number pending receipt of transcript.) 
Therefore, appellee counsel's masterful use of innuendo obviously served 
to undermine any curative effect which the court's restrictions on closing 
argument may have had, and very clearly resulted in prejudice to the appellant 
in the ultimate decision of the jury. 
The public policy supporting the exclusion of evidence contained in 
settlement negotiations is a strong one. The courts are provided to resolve 
disputes which cannot be otherwise resolved. However, the law should 
encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes without resort to the courts. 
Indeed, the courts would be crippled if the number of disputes currently 
resolved without trial were to drastically increase. 
Undoubtedly, resolution of disputes without judicial process would 
become far more limited if statements made in settlement negotiations were 
to be admitted in the trial of those matters which are not resolved. While the 
critical admission in the present case went only to an opinion of facts in a letter 
which plaintiff wrote without careful reflection and before he had consulted 
with counsel, other settlement negotiations require for success candor in 
assessing one's potential liabilities. The necessary dialogue concerning the 
strengths and weaknesses of one's legal claims would surely be frustrated if any 
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inroads are IHTIIUI te<f on the longstanding rule prohibiting the admission of 
evidence from settlement negotiations at trial. 
POINT IV 
THE ERRORS WHICH OCCURRED IN THE TRIAL COURT ARE 
PREJUDICIAL AND SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED THE 
OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL. 
Appellant maintains that if the foregoing had not occurred, th» ISSIH^ of 
negligence and damages would have been ruled on differently. Utah case law 
establishes that in cases where errors occur and most, likely a different result 
or ruling would have been obtained if the errors had not occurred; those errors 
are prejudicial,, and a new trial is in order. However, the errors must be 
substantial and go to the heart of litigant's rights and the fair adjudication of 
the actioi,I Pearce v. Wistisen. 701 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah 1989) states; 
Nor is the fact alone that evidence was erroneously admitted 
sufficient to set aside a verdict unless it has "had a substantial 
influence in bringing about the verdict." Conversely, where 
evidence was shown to have supported only conjectural inferences 
which had little probative value, or where no evidence was 
adduced that showed that a fact had any causal connection with 
the plaintiffs injury, reviewing courts have reversed cases on 
grounds that the improperly admitted evidence could only have 
served to confuse and mislead the jury or to prejudice the 
outcome of the case, [citations omitted] 
Conversely, Egbert & Javnes v. R.C. Tolman Const.. 680 P.2d 746, 747 Utah 
1984) states !ha! :« ruling of a trial court will not be reversed if substantial 
evidence supports the ruling. 
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State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), defines the two types of errors 
that result in reversal. The first type is where the right for review is preserved 
in the trial court by making timely objections and motions raising the issues 
for review. The second type is where the issues have not been preserved in the 
court below, however, their "manifest injustice" requires their review. 
In the present situation the issues were preserved below and therefore 
are analyzed accordingly. The standard as set out in Verde establishes that for 
review,"... there is a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome 
in the trial court." Id. at 121, 770 P.2d 116. Redev. Agcv. of Salt Lake Citv v. 
Tanner. 740 P.2d 1296, 1303-04 (Utah 1987) also states, "the exclusion of 
evidence is harmless unless the excluded evidence would probably have had a 
substantial influence in bringing about a different finding." 
In Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987) the court required 
that the error be "substantial and prejudicial in that the appellant was deprived 
in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed issues by the 
jury." Ashton also quotes Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as 
stating: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and 
no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for 
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of 
the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. 
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The three errors complained of in the present case went to the heart of 
the jury's determination. Davidson bruits flit1 present appeal because he 
complains both that the amount of the damages awarded were too low, and the 
percentage of negligence assigned to him was too high. The court's instruction 
on the tax consequences of a personal injury judgment clearly inviten tin* jury 
lot educe their award, just as they would be inclined to increase their award 
if they were instructed that the amount given will IK* reduced by a one-third 
contingent fee to the plaintiff's attorney and any costs incurred in pursuing the 
action. Likewise, 40% contributtuy negligence assigned to plaintiff was 
obviously based on defendant's argument that Davidson had cornered the 
animal which hml escaped fmm defendant's truck. This argument found its 
greatest support through a statement contained m a lettei of settlement 
negotiation which was improperly admitted. Finally, appellant maintains that 
a greater amount of negligence would have been assigned In the defendant (and 
hence a lesser amount of negligence assigned to plaintiff) had plaintiff's expert 
not been restricted from providing the jurv with his conclusions from his 
scientific investigation of the accident. 
Appellant respeetfully submits that the errors, defects, or omissions of 
the trial court substantially affected his rights and hindered a fair adjudication 
of his action and therefore, is inconsistent with substantial justice. Appellant 
also respectfully submits thai had these-1 <»irors defects, and omissions not 
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occurred, the confusion regarding negligence and damages would not have 
occurred, and the verdict would reflect an accurate and judicially fair result. 
CONCLUSION 
The instruction concerning tax aspects of damage awards ran contrary 
to the general weight of authority in our sister states, and served to imduly 
prejudice the jury's determination on damages. The two errors concerning 
admission of evidence going to the issue of each party's negligence appear to 
have a direct impact on the fact finder's determination that the negUgence 
should be split 60-40. In addition, when examining the amount of stipulated 
special damages, in light of the 60-40 split of negligence, it is clear that the 
jury's findings as to damages were directly tied to their findings of negligence. 
Accordingly, appellant would respectfully request the court to cure these 
errors by remanding for a new trial on all issues where proper evidence as to 
appellee's negUgence may be admitted and where improper evidence concerning 
appellee's allegations of appeUant's contributory negligence will be excluded. 
DATED AND SIGNED this \fytos of November, 1990. 
IVIEtfYOUNG 
Attorneys for AppeUant 
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ADDENDUM 
I. DETERMINATIVE RULES 
A. 11 (ah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 
14. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule HI 
C Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408 
D. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704 
11 LETTER OF SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATION 
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Rule 59 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion tor a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59. F.A. IP. of verdict or indictment, Rules of E if ence, 
Cross-Refe ences. — Fee for filing motion Rule 606. 
un - w ' lai, * 21-2-2. 
HanHe** ,i*t>r not ground foi new trialf 
R>le 6 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 61 
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299, 
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Cox, 16 
Utah 2d 20, 395 P.2d 55 (1964); Parker v. 
Rolfson, 525 P.2d 612 (Utah 1974); Dynapac, 
Inc. v. Innovations, Inc., 550 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1976), Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123 
(Utah 1977); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 
589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978); Peay v. Peay, 607 
P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. 
Osborne, 622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Kohler v. 
Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); St. 
Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982); 
Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495 (Utah 1983); 
Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1984); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700 
(Utah 1985); In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d 
1345 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 
(Utah 1986); Myers v. Garff, 655 F. Supp. 1021 
(D. Utah 1987); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 
1318 (Utah 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 
1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Blodgett v. Zions 
First Natl Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 
131 (Utah 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 200, 671 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 228 et seq., 
237. 
A.L.R. — Incompetence of counsel as ground 
for relief from state court civil judgment, 64 
A.L.R.4th 323. 
Relief from judicial error by motion under 
F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(1), 1 A.L.R. Fed. 771. 
Propriety of conditions imposed in granting 
relief from judgment under Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. Fed. 956. 
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of 
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or 
other parts of the records and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A.L.R. 
Fed. 794. 
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing 
relief from final judgment where its prospec-
tive application is inequitable, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 
309. 
Independent actions to obtain relief from 
judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule 
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
53 A.L.R. Fed. 558. 
Lack of jurisdiction, or jurisdictional error, 
as rendering federal district court judgment 
"void" for purposes of relief under Rule 60(b)(4) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A.L.R. 
Fed. 831. 
Effect of filing of notice of appeal on motion 
to vacatejudgment under Rule 60(b) of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 A.L.R. Fed. 148. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 294 et seq., 
306, 307. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturb-
ing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 61, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Admission of evidence. 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Burden of showing error. 
Exclusion of evidence. 
Instructions. 
Judgment presumed valid. 
Judicial nooice. 
Liability for costs. 
Notice of appeal. 
Party creating or appro ing error. 
Refusal to « »^ct vf***di^ . 
Refusal to grant mistri*\ 




Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise. 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accept-
ing or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromis-
ing or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either 
validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the 
claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise 
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclu-
sion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in 
the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclu-
sion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or 
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an 
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable 
to Rules 52 and 53, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) but is broader to the extent that it ex-






When an injured plaintiff and one or more, 
but not all, defendant tortfeasors enter into a 
settlement agreement, the parties must 
promptly inform the court and the other par-
ties to the action of the existence of the agree-
ment and of its terms. If the action is tried by a 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§ 629 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 285. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of admissions made 
in connection with offers or discussions of com-
promise, 15 A.L.R.3d 13. 
Cross-References. — Offer of judgment, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 68. 
Release or settlement of personal injury 
claim, rescission or disavowal of, § 78-27-32. 
jury, the court shall, upon motion ot a party, 
disclose the existence and basic content of the 
agreement to the jury unless the court finds 
that, on facts particular to the case, such dis-
closure will create substantial danger of undue 
e, prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of mis-
a leading the jury. Slusher v. Ospital, 111 Utah 
st Adv. Rep. 18 (1989). 
 Cited in Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987). 
Admissibility of evidence showing payment, 
or offer or promise of payment, of medical, hos-
pital, and similar expenses of injured party by 
opposing party, 65 A.L.R.3d 932. 
Key Numbers. — Evidence «» 213. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with 





The expertise of the witness, his degree of 
familiarity with the necessary facts, and the 
logical nexus between his opinion and the facts 
adduced must be established before an expert's 
P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980); American Concept Ins. 
Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Com-
ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the 
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Consti-
Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 
1979). 
opinion is admissible as to an ultimate issue. 
Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 
1979) (referred to in Advisory Committee 
Note). 
Opinion testimony of expert witness was not 
rendered inadmissible by fact that it may have 
embraced the ultimate factual issue to be de-
cided by the jury. Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 
622 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1980). 
Cited in Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 
tutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81 
(1989). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
October 1, 1987 
To whom it may concern 
Re; injury claim 
Gentlemen: 
It appears you have been poorly informed as to Mr. Grant 
Davidson's injury claim. 
Please allow us to clairify: r^. Davidson while performing 
his job for the D & RGW Railroad, saw the injured cow sitting on 
the railroad. He stopped and got: out some 10 feet from the 
animal. He made no move towards the injured cow but while 
standing still was charged. He fled the cow, but it caught him, 
goreing him in the back rind sending him air born for 
approximately 2 0 feet whtre he landed on the rail en his knee. 
The attack continued with the cow attempting to trample 
Mr. Davidson to death, as he lay stunned with a concussion on the 
ground he pushed the animal off and escaped to the safety of a 
rail car. 
The cow continued to charge repeatedly and finally moved 
off. It then charged nany others before it was kiPed. 
Mr. Davidson did not persue, chase or attempt to move the 
cow. As it (the cow) was injured in the accident, it became 
abnormally dangerous. 
We have been advised by legal counsel that the contents of a 
truck, when they spill and are dangerous (as this case). Are the 
responsibility of the insurer when those dangerous contents 
injure innocent people. 
Mr. Davidson has a permenate knee problem, and must wear a 
brace while doing any work. He's had 16 years with this job, 
which is now jepordized by this injury. He has lost wages, has 
great suffering and now is going to be disabled the rest of his 
life. 
We don't intend to ±et you or that trucking company off, with a 
letter telling us that your not responsible. 
P<~ge Two 
September 29, 1987 
You may speak with us 
and t o c o u r t , you dec ide . 
d i r e c t l y c r we can send i t t o l a w y e r s 
Very s i n c e r e l y , 
Grant S. Davidson 
Sandy J . Davidson 
